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THIS study deals with the ways in which the components of population
change are related to growth and age composition.In general all of
these relations and their sources are sufficiently obvious. They turn on
a few basic facts of life. Birth is the beginning of life and death its termin-
ation, but death occurs at every age, whereas all births occur at age zero.
It follows that a rise in the birth tends both to lift the rate of growth
and to increase the proportion of children in the population. On the
other hand, whereas falling death rates also tend to increase growth,
their effect on the age composition of the population depends on the age
incidence of the change in the risks of dying.In the past, peace-time
reductions in mortality have had an age incidence that affected the age
composition of the surviving populations rather little, tending to increase
slightly the proportions in the youngest and oldest ages in a manner that
on balance generally somewhat reduced the average age of thepopulation.1
Basic Patterns in Population Change
Another basic element is the fact that vital events have rather definite
age patterns. The human female seldom gives birth before 15 or after
' There is a considerable literature on this subject, including:
J. Bourgeois-Pichat, "Charges de Ia Population Active," Journal de la SociétéStatistique
de Paris, Vol. 91, flOS. 3—4, March—April, 1950, pp. 94—"4.
Ansley J. Coale, "The Effects of Changes in Mortality and Fertility on Age Com-
position," Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, January, 1956, Vol. 34, flO. i, pp. 79—114.
F. Lorimer, "Dynamics of Age Structure in a Population with Initially High Fertility
and Mortality," Population Bulletin of the United Nations, December, 195!, rio. i, pp. 31—41.
A. Sauvy, "Le Vieillissement des Populations et l'Allongement de la Vie," Population,
October—December, Vol.g, no. 4, pp. 675—682.
G. Stolnitz, "Mortality Declines and Age Distributions," Milbank Memorial Fund
Quarterly, Vol. 34, flO. 2, April, 1956, pp. 178—215.
United Nations Population Division, "The Cause of the Aging ofPopulations: Declining
Mortality or Declining Fertility?", Population Bulletin of the United Nations,
1954,, no. 4, pp. 30—38.
V. G. Valaoras, "Patterns of Aging of Human Populations," in the report of the
Eastern States Health Education Conference, The Social and Biological Challenge of our
Aging Population, Columbia University Press, '95o, pp. 67—85.
Note: The assistance of Mrs. Erna Harm in carrying through the population projec-
tions is gratefully acknowledged.
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50yearsof age, and, within these ages, the rate of childbearing
rapidly to its maximum between 20and30andthereafter falls off sharply.
There is also a typical pattern in the risks of death, which are high in
infancy and early childhood, decline to a minimum between 10and15
years,rise at first rather gradually and then with progressive speed.
Migration, like death, can occur at any age, but has, in fact, a typical
pattern of heavy concentration between ages 15and35. Obviously, the
effect of migration on the growth and age of a particular population
depends on the direction, magnitude, and duration of the movement.
In addition to these specific components of growth, there are their
interrelations. From the point of view of a particular population, all
persons born must eventually emigrate or die, and, before çloing either,
may have one or more offspring. Those who immigrate may also produce
offspring before they emigrate or die. By contrast, death has no sub-
sequent direct relation to the other vital processes.The secondary
consequences, however, may be quite important, as, for example, when
a shortage of males produced by war casualties increases the proportion
of spinsters and reduces the number of births.
Finally, it is evident that the rates of birth, death, and natural increase
are sharply influenced by the age composition of the population, as well
as by the age specific risks of bearing and dying. At any given instant,
the size and age composition of the population is the resultant of the
fluctuating rates of birth, death, and migration during its past history.
With so many determinants of growth, each possessing substantial
possibilities for variation in direction, magnitude, and age incidence, the
number of possible combinations becomes indefinitely large. In principle,
the range of possibilities presents formidable barriers to systematic
analysis.In fact, however, the problem is more manageable than it
appears to be because of the ways in which the variables have operated.
In many countries, emigration has been negligible.In most of the
underdeveloped countries fertility has been both high and relatively
invariant. Throughout most of the world, mortality has been falling, and
in many instances during recent decades it has been falling very rapidly.
In many of the underdeveloped countries, therefore, the combination of
negligible emigration, high fertility, and falling mortality is producing
progressively rapid population growth. Moreover, for reasons already
noted, these mounting rates of population growth have been coupled
with rising proportions of the population in the ages of young dependency.
The situation in the developed areas stand in sharp contrast with that
of the underdeveloped areas.In the latter, mortality has been the
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principal variable. Its trend is almost universally downward in a fashion
that has a marked effect on the rates of increase but slight effect on the
age composition. In the developed countries, on the other hand, fertility
is the principal variable. During recent decades, in some countries, it
has moved more or less steadily down; in others, it has moved down and
then sharply up. In still others, it has moved down, then sharply up, and
then• down again.Moreover, these movements, affecting as they do
inputs at the beginning of the age span, sharply modify both the rate of
growth and the age composition of the population.It would require a
variety of models, therefore, to illustrate the interaction of vital trends,
growth and age structure in the developed countries during recent
decades.
Developments in the United States between '930and1955
Inthe face of this complexity, the simplest approach to the interaction
of vital rates and population growth and structure in the developed
countries is by means of specific illustrations. In what follows we shall be
concerned with developments between 1930and1955 in the female
population of the United States. The female population is selected instead
of the total, both to save computation and to avoid the complexities of
dealing with troops overseas and with war casualties. A similar analysis
for the male or the total population would give essentially similar results.
The influence of each element of change between 1930and1955may
be shown by comparing the actual trends of population with successive
projections of hypothetical trends that depart from the actual situation
by the alteration of specific components of change. In this manner we
can illustrate the effect of the 1930agedistribution on subsequent
growth, and show the effect of migration, changes in mortality, and
changes in fertility on both the trends between 1930and and the
size and composition of the population in I955.
This system of projections has been carried out by rough and ready
methods which are sufficiently precise to serve present purposes. The
initial 1930population,for example, has been adjusted for the under-
enumeration of children from birth to age 5, but left otherwise uncorrected
for even obvious deficiencies. Similarly, fertility rates between 1930and
1955havebeen adjusted for underregistration of births, but fertility rates
that run from January to January have been used, although the census
figures run from April 1930toApril 1955.Moreover,instead of using
annual age specific fertility rates, births have been estimated from general
fertility rates for successive quinquennial periods. Surviving populations
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have been moved forward in quinquennial age groups five years at a
time by means of survival ratios interpolated from available life tables, so
that annual variations in mortality have been left out of accountsIt has
been assumed, without serious violation to the facts, that there was no
migration between 1930and1940.Thereafter,the estimates of migration
used by the Bureau of the Census have been used, often with rather
drastic interpolation to fit the necessary time periods.
The projected estimates yielded by such procedures are not closely
calibrated, but neither are they grossly in error in ways that distort the
comparisons needed for present purposes. There has been no attempt to
close with the censuses of i940 and1950orwith the official estimates for
1955.Chart1permitsthe comparison of the female population, as
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interpolatedto April 1955fromthe census estimates, with our estimate
of the population for that date obtained by projecting the 1930population
with actual migration and fertility and mortality rates for 1930—1955.
PanelA of Chart 3 permits analogous comparison for the total female
population between 1930and1955.
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The projected estimates of the actual situation are a trifle high, but it would be
difficult to say which of the two results depart further from the truth. The most
conspicuous disagreement between the projected figures and the census estimates
falls in the group aged 20—25in1955, hence that born between 1930and1935.
Thisis the least reliable period of birth registration with which we are concerned.
A considerable part of the excess population projected for that group may well
come from an over-generous allowance for incomplete registration in those years.
There is a bump in the projected figures between ages 6o and 65 which is clearly
the attenuated reflection of the corresponding bump between ages 35 and 40in
the1930. census.The projected figures for the ages over 8o in 1955fallbelow
those of the census, which are almost certainly inflated by exaggeration of age.
Whatever the sources of the discrepancies between the estimates
and the estimates projected from 1930forthç actual population in 1955,
itis clear that both series tell the same story.In the remainder of the
paper, for consistency's sake, the "actual" population will be represented
by the values obtained by projecting the actual course of events from the
1930census.
Before turning to an examination of the components of change between•
1930and1955, it should be noted that the results refleèt the events of a
speèific period. Had we dealt with the first thirty years of the century
the answers would have been sharply different. Both migration and the
decline of mortaiity tended to increase the speed of growth.Their
influence, however, was more çhan canceled by the steady decline of the
birth rate, which was also the source of the rapid aging of the population.
Between 1930and1955,bycontrast, migration was very small and the
birth rates moved first down, then up. The gains from rising birth rates
canceled the losses of the earlier fall.If the study had closed with 1958
instead of 1955 the gains due to the rise of the birth rate would have been
considerably larger than those presented below. In short, this analysis
illustrates the principles of change, but the specific results relate only to
the period under study.
The object of Chart 2isto illustrate the extent to which the size and
age composition of the 1955populationdepended on the age composition
of the population in 1930.PanelA shows the 1955distributionand that
for 1930,fromwhich it developed. The relatively small number aged
0—4in1930reflectsthe fact that births were less numerous between 1925
andi930 thanin the preceding five years. •The survivors of this smaller
group, born in the years 1925—1930,piusa few immigrants, .appear
between ages 25 and 30in1955. The deeper trough for the younger
ages in the 1955curvereflects the still smaller birth classes of the years
1930to1940.Thevery much larger numbers below age 15 in 1955 are
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CHART 3
Effect of 1930 U.S. Age Structure on 1930—1955 FemalePopulation Size
the result of the sharp war and postwar recovery of the birth rate. Clearly
below age 25thedistribution of the 1955populationhas been primarily
determined by the drastic changes in the course of the birth rate between
1930and1955.Theactual course of vital rates from 1930onwould have
yielded something of the same general pattern in 1955hadit started
from any plausible age distribution in 1930.
Howmuch then would the course of events have differed if the actual
trends had started from a 1930populationof the same size but a different
age composition? Since there is an infinite number of possibilities there
is an infinite number of answers. There is no population that is the most
reasonable alternative to the actual one. To gain some insight into the
influence of the initial age distribution, the stable age distribution
obtained from the vital rates of i929—1931 hasbeen selected as a standard
of comparison.This amounts to the age distribution that U.S. females
would have had in 1930if,prior to 1930,theage specific risks of bearing
and dying had been fixed at the levels that characterized the years
1929—193!,andthere had been no migration. This hypothetical popula-
tion for 1930wasthen projected to 1955withactual migration and
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course of for 1930to andthe actual one shows the lingering
consequences of pre-1930 variations in fertility and migration, which had
given the 1930 age distribution its particular structure.Panel B of
Chart 2 shows that under these circumstances the 1955 population would
have been considerably older thanit actually was. Panel B of Chart 3
shows that growth would have been much slowçr and the 1955total
female population would have been some io n-iillion smaller than it
actually was in 1955. In short, the general shape of the 1955population
under 25 years of age was mainly determined by the course of events
after [930, but both the rate of growth between [930 and [955 and the
youth of the population in 1955aredue in part to the fact that events
prior tO [930 had left the population with rather large proportions in the
childbearing ages.
Panel A of Chart 4 permits comparison of the actual trend of the total
female population between [930 and [955 with the hypothetical trend
that results from projecting the [930 population without migration or
change in vital rates from the levels characterizing 1929—1931. Successive
panels permit tracing the differences shown in Panel A to their source.
Each shows the actual trend and the trend as projected under actual
conditions except for a single variable. In the hypothetical case oi Panel
B there is no migration between [930 and [955, in that of Panel C the
mortality rates are constantly those of 1929—193i,,andin that of Panel D
the fertility rates are constantly those of the sarrie base period. MigratiOn
and changes in vital rates made rather little diff&ence in the size of the
population until I945, but a growing difference thereafter. By [955 they
had given us some 9 million additional females.It is evident that the
effect of migration was rather small, and that 'the principal gain from
changes after [930 was from the decline of mortality. This deèline in the
risks of death after i93o had added some 5 million females to the popu-
lation by 1955.Changesin fertility were more complicated, since birth
rates dropped below thei929—193! levelduring thei930'sand rose
sharply in the [940'sand1950's. A maintenance of the, fertility of
[931 throughout the period would have given us a larger female population
each year up to [950.
Thenet change in the female population from [930to1955 and its
sources are shown in Chart 5 for all ages and for each of four broad age
groups.2 Between these two dates the female population grew by about
2It isto be noted that the sum of the individual effects of migration, changes in
mortality, and changes in fertility as measured here should exceed the total departures
from the actual situation from all sources combined which are obtained from the difference
between the projection for the actual situation and that which assumed no migration and
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Components of Change in U.S. Female Population, by Age, 1930—1955
23 million. Of this 23 million increase, 14 million, or about 6o per cent,
would have occurred even if fertility and mortality had remained un-
changed after 1930 and there had been no migration. The remaining 8.7
million increase is accounted for by 5 million from reduced mortality,
and a little less than two million each from migration and increased
fertility.
About 50 per cent of the total increase attributable to migration and
changes in vital rates falls in the group under i 7 years of age in 1955.
Indeed, just the rise in fertility accounted for an additional 2.5 million
in that group, whereas the earlier decline in fertility below the 1929—193!
level reduced the number of persons aged by about o.8 million.
On the other hand, half of the increase due to migration fell in the age
group 17—45. years. The numerical gains due to declining death rates
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groups, but increases from this source were much the most evenly
distributed of all.
Chart .6 presents the same series of projections for the age distributions
of 1955.PanelA shows the distribution of the actual female population
of andthe hypothetical distribution derived from the assumption
of no migration or change in vital rates after 1930.Thesuccessive panels
permit the comparison of the actual distribution with hypothetical
distributions obtained from projections of the actual course of events
except for a single variable. The hypothetical population of Panel B
assumes no migration after 1930,thatof Panel C assumes a continuation
of 1929—I931 mortalityrates, and that of Panel D the continuation of
I929—I 93!fertility rates.
Migration and changes in vital rates after 1930producedmarked
changes in both the size and the age composition of the 1955 population.
The influence of migration was small and concentrated under age 55.
Under age 20,thedifferences in the two lines represent births to migrants
as well as migrants themselves. Panel C brings out clearly the fact that
reductions in, the risk of death since 1930havesaved many lives, and
that these changes have had very little effect on the age distribution.It
is changes in fertility that have brought the major shifts in the age
structure of the population. With the fertility rates of 1929—1931we
would have had some two million fewer girls under 5 years of age than
were present in 1955.
Forpurposes of economic analysis, the shifts in the age structure of the
population may be generalized in terms of the ratio of the population in
the ages of dependency to the population in the working years of life.
Without too much violation of the facts we may classify the population
under age 17 and over age 65 as dependents, and that between ages i
and65 as workers. Chart 7 presents this "ratio of dependents to workers"
over the period 1930to1955forthe array of actual and hypothetical
populations with which we have been dealing.
In the actual population, the ratio dropped sharply from 1930to
1940,wassteady during the war, and rose even more sharply to 1955,
whenit was well above the 1930levelat 68 per cent. The trend was
sharply downward during the, great depression, and even more sharply
•upward during the postwar inflationary years.Panel A shows that, if
we had had neither migration nor change in vital rates after 1930,the
dependency ratio would have been higher through 1945,butsubstantially
lower by 1955.
Theinfluence of migration on the ratio is too small to be shown
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Effect of Changing Vital Rates and Initial Age Structure on Ratio of
Females in Dependent Ages to Females in Working Ages, U.S., 1930—1955
graphically.Panel B presents the comparison of the actual trend with
the hypothetical trend that comes from projecting the stable age distri-
bution of 1929—1931withactual migration and vital rates from 1930on.
Much of the decline in the ratio to 1940waslocked up in the 1930age
distribution, as a product of the vital trends and migration before that
date. The dependency load from 1935 on has been substantially lighter
than would have been the case if our population had had a stable age
structure in 1930.
InPanel C the hypothetical population is real except that the mortality
is held to the level of 1929—1931.Thereduction of death rates since
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more rapidly than in the middle years.Lower risks of death have
somewhat increased the dependency load.
Panel D shows clearly that a major source of the dip and rise in the
ratio has been the change in fertility. The hypothetical population in
this case is real except that fertility is held constant at the 1929—1931
level. Both the decline in the ratio during the 1930's and its rise during
the postwar years would have been much less sharp if fertility had
remained constant at the 1929—1931 level.
Trends in Other Developed Countries.
As already pointed out, the trends considered here are specific to the
time and place. Even in the years since 1930 the experience of many
developed countries has differed sharply from that of the United States.
The decline in peacetime mortality has been very general, but it has
stimulated population growth without substantially altering the age
distribution. A prominent exception is the changed age structure in
nations that suffered heavy casualties during the war. Some nations have
also exjerienced heavy immigration and some emigration in ways that
alter both numbers and age structures.
The nations of Western Europe and the English-speaking countries
outside of Europe have generally experienced prolonged declines in the
birth rates which were checked toward the end of the 1930's and reversed
sharply after the end of the war. In some the birth rate declined, again,
but the usual result is a changing age structure somewhat similar to that
which we have experienced with different details and magnitudes.
The large birth classes of the years prior to the first World War are
often to be found expanding the labor force during the depression years
when the ebb of births was sharply checking the expansion of population
in the dependent ages.Even more generally in the prosperous years
following World War II the small birth classes of the depression years
were yielding only a slow expansion of the population in the working
ages, precisely when numbers in the childhood ages were mounting
rapidly.
It is not the purpose of this paper to allocate cause and effect relations
among demographic and economic factors. Here we need only point out
the fact that the depression came at the same time as the sharp .decline
in dependency ratios, and that the postwar prosperity came at the same
time as the sharp rise in that ratio. Indeed, since fertility is under wide-
spread voluntary control, the same perverse association of economic and
demographic variables might be expected again if we were to undergo a
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prolonged and deep depression, followed in fifteen or twenty years by
high levels of prosperity. That is about the time required for the births
of the ebb to enter the labor force of the flow.
For the developed economies, about the only safe generalizations are
the obvious ones:
i. The size and age composition of a population are heavily influenced
by its size and age composition a quarter of a century earlier.
2. The rate of growth can be sharply modified by changes in the course
of migration, mortality and fertility in a twenty-five year period.
3. The age composition has been little affected by changes in mortality,
but with death rates as close to zero as they now are at ages under 45,
the period for which this proposition can be confidently stated is drawing
to a close.
4. In countries of low mortality, barring major catastrophe and major
migration, changes in fertility provide the most important source of
change in both the rate of growth and the age composition.
5. The continuation of a very low mortality and medium fertility,
such as that which characterizes the United States at present, yields both
rapid growth and high burdens of dependency as conventionally defined.
COMMENT
JOHN V. GRAUMAN, United Nations
Notestein's presentation is so effective and so self-contained that I can
add very little while staying within its scope.If my comments are to
contribute to discussion, I have no choice but to range beyond the subject
treated in the paper.
Within the space allotted to me, I hope to be able to make four points:
i. Developments in other industrialized countries have been quite
diverse;
2. Much use can be derived from the observation that age structures
are very little affected by ordinary changes in mortality;
3. The age structure of the United States population provides good
material for the study of causal, relationships between economic and
demographic trends;
4. For the further progress of demographic science, it is becoming
desirable to study the structural dynamics of population also in terms
other than age.
First Point:Other Countries
Notestein's paper makes it very clear that changes in fertility, mortality,
and migration all have their effects on the rate of population growth, but
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that changes in fertility alone have major effects on population age
structure.In industrialized countries, mortality is now so low that its
further decline cannot be very rapid, but fertility is apt to fluctuate
substantially. In a population of large size, migration is unlikely to haye
large effects.
The forces which have determined population growth and structure in
the United States have also been at work, with varying intensity, in other
industrialized countries. The effects, however, have been quite diverse,
as illustrated in Chart '.Enthis chart, the female population of various
countries is shown by five-year age segments as percentages of total female
population. Two graphs are superimposed wherever the comparison
seemed to be particularly interesting.
The first panel shows the populations of the United States and Aus-
tralia, which are at opposite poles of the earth. Despite the geographical
distance, the structures are so similar that one population can be easily
mistaken for the other. Australia has been more affected by immigration
than the United States, but the birth rate trends in the two countries
have been very similar.
The second panel shows the age structures of two close neighbors:
Austria and Yugoslavia. They diyerge conspicuously.Birth rates in
Austria have long been very low and fluctuating. Yugoslavia's bfrth rate,
though declining, is still comparatively high. One might attribute the
difference to the fact that Austria has been more industrialized than
Yugoslavia. But this is not the only reason.
France and Italy are compared in the next panel. The size of the age
group 0—4showsthat both countries have nOw about the same crude
birth rate. But this birth rate results in France from a smaller proportion
of women in childbearing ages than in Italy.French are now
more fertile than Italian women. But France has long been more indus-
trialized than Italy.Because of its larger proportion of aged persons,
France has a higher death rate than Italy, though specific death risks are
no lower in Italy than they are in France.
The last panel compared the populations of Sweden and Japan.
Sweden, relatively little affecied by wars, shows perhaps the most typical
trend for a Western population. Here, a recovery of the birth rate around
1940hasnow definitely ebbed away, and fertility is again very low. In
Japan, since quite recently, fertility is now as low as in Sweden. Because
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Second Point:Mortality Hardly Affects Age Structure
Notestein's paper shows that the decline of United States mortality has
had very little effect on age structure.This observation is very useful
because it can be widely generalized. As Coale and Bourgeois-Pichat'
have demonstrated, the age structure of almost any population is very
nearly the same as it would be if mortality had always been at the level
attained most recently.2 Therefore, under most practical conditions, the
effects on age structure of higher mortality rates in the past. can be almost
discounted.
This observation has been used in the work. of the United Nations
dealing with the populations of underdeveloped countries.In most
underdeveloped countries, mortality is declining but birth rates have
changed very little, if at all. Since mortality has little effect on age struc-
ture and fertility has varied little, the age structures in underdeveloped
countries are very similar to those of populations having constant mor-
tality and constant fertility. A system of such stable populations has been
calculated at the United Nations from model life tables and has found
many uses in population estimates for underdeveloped countries.
For rough-and-ready comparisons, stable population models can also
be used in the case of a country like the United States in 1955, whose
birth rate has been fluctuating.I will presently show. how this can be
done.
A population model can be selected according to a level of fertility and
a level of mortality.In the United States, expectation of life .at birth
now approaches 70 years. This level of mortality is also assumed in the
model.
United States fertility has fluctuated recently from a gross reproduction
rate of only slightly above 1.00 in the 1930's to one approaching '.75
in the 1950's. Both fertility levels are relevant and the population
models of such fertility are shown in Chart 2.The structure of the
actual population differs considerably from either of the two extreme
models.
Between these extremes, a fertility level can also be selected for a model
to represent some reasonable average of recent conditions. The sum of
absolute deviations of the actual population from the model was found
1AnsleyJ.Coale, "How the Age Distribution of a Human Population is Determined,"
ColdSpringHarbor Symposia on Quantitalive Biology, J. Bourgeois-Pichat, International
Statistical Institute, Stockholm, i
2Thecoincidence of actual age structure with that which would have resulted had
current mortality also prevailed in the past is not perfect, but discrepancies are seldom
large, except at the most advanced ages.
278to be least when the gross reproduction rate in the model is assumed to
be 1.50.Thismodel is also shown in Chart
The age structures of the actual population and of the average model
intersect in three points, near the ages of 10, 30, and 65 years, respectively.
Compared to the stable average, the United States, in 1955, had a rather
high proportion of small children, rather low proportion of adolescents
and young adults, and so far, still a low proportion of aged persons. With
time, these relative excesses and deficiencies will move farther up the age
scale.
in Chart 3, the sizes of actual age groups are expressed as percentages
relative to numbers in the average population model. In a sense, this is
a chart of the history of United States fertility relative to that, in the
average model. Fertility, as a ratio of children to women of childbearing
3This,like any other averaging procedure, is only an arbitrary device which may
have some practicai uses.
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ages, is roughly indicated by the broken arrows in the chart. Recently,
this ratio has been somewhat higher than the assumed average. In the
1930's, it was considerably lower.In a still earlier period, it was con-
siderably higher.
Chart 3 has three scales: the age of each group of the population in
1955; the date when. each of these groups were born; and the date when
they attain ages 15—19 years and, therefore, become candidates for entry
into the labor force.
There was a rising trend in birth numbers around the turn of the
century, reaching a peak in 1910—1915. Then there was a sharp slow-
down until the early 1930's, followed by a renewed steep rise to a plateau
which has been maintained for the past ten years.
The rate of growth in potential labor force is mainly determined by
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a rising tide until about '930. Then, they fell off sharply to a low point
which was reached about 1955.From here on, labor force can be
expected to grow very rapidly again.
It is possible that the two trends are interrelated.It can be noted for
the past 30yearsthat when entrants into labor force were many, births were
few, and when entrants into labor force were few, births were many.In fact,
there may be a negative correlation between the supply of labor and the
birth rate. And this brings me to my third point, namely that a contem-
plation of the age structure is useful in the study of economic and
demographic relationships.
Third Point: Population and the Economy
This possibility is strongly suggested in Notestein's paper, especially in
his last chart.It is shown there that everything seems. to have conspired
to accertuate the change in the ratio of dependents to workers that would
otherwise have occurred. The fertility trend, in particular, has contributed
greatly to this sharp change in the dependency ratio.
Elsewhere in this Conference it is suggested that a high dependency
ratio stimulates demands for goods and services, and that these demands
generate a high level of employment. Little consideration, however, has
been given at this Conference to the effects of a changing supply of the labor
force itself.
As a matter of primitive economics, it would seem that when there is a
rapid influx of entrants into working ages, the marginal value of each
entrant will be low relative to the value of other factors of production,
for example, land and machinery. When the suppiy of labor is, reduced,
on the other hand, the entrants into labor force will command a relatively
high price.
It may be presumed that, early in this century, the economy was geared
to a situation in which the ranks of the labor force were swelling rapidly.
the continued absorption of growing numbers of entrants
encountered difficulties.Around that time, fertility came increasingly
under deliberate control and declined, at first slowly, and later more
rapidly.
After 1930,therate of entry into labor force slowed down. The
economy underwent a reorganization in the depression.It can be pre-
sumed that eventually the economy became geared to a situation in
which the supply of the labor force was a dwindling one. This situation
has prevailed until now and has been associated with prosperity.
During this period of small labor supply and prosperity, persons in the
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labor force enjoyed considerable job security and prospects for economic
advancement. This period had a high birth rate.
By 1955, the labor supply reached rock bottom. From now until the
early 1970's, it will increase greatly.Workers may encounter greater
difficulties of employment unless the economy can make a flexible adjust-
ment to this changing situation. With marginal value of entrants into
labor force on the decline, it is possible that the birth rate will drop again
in the near future. A decline in the marriage rate has already been noted
this year.
If this view has any validity, then it can be presumed that the labor
market and the birth rate will tend to move in alternating cycles. This
may already be the case in Sweden where a relatively early recovery of
the birth rate has given way to a renewed decline.
Fourth Point.•Population Structure in Terms Other than Age
Notestein has wisely refrained from drawing any inferences of the type
which I have just outlined. The truth is that, so long as demography is
confined to sex-and-age groups of the population, we are still far from
coming to grips with the mechanism by which population trends influence
the economy, and vice versa.
As is convincingly pointed out in another paper of this Conference,
decisions which affect both the economy and population trends are usually
taken within the household, the spending unit, or some other
primary groupings of this type.
Demography remains the child of actuarial science so long as it confines
its analysis to individuals of varying sex and age. True, the dynamics of
age structure and of age specific risks has become a powerful tool of
demographic analysis and has been carried to a very high degree of
refinement. But demographic analysis must not stop here.Its further
progress will depend on the way in which it can meet a new challenge.
We are now being challenged to regard a population as composed of
families or households of varying structure. In this population, we must
examine the rates at which families of one type are replaced by families
of another type. The definitions are still obscure, and the dynamics of a
population in terms of family structure are likely to become very complex.
Great efforts will be needed to meet this new challenge with as much
success as has been attained in the demographic analysis of age structure.
When the dynamics of family structure are being explored, great progress
in our still limited understanding of demographic, economic and social
interrelations is to .be expected.
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Notestein makes the point that the size and age of a population are
heavily influenced by the size and age composition of that population a
generation earlier.Individual units are added to a population at age
zero and move through that population in well-defined steps. A few
individuals are added at adult ages through migration and they move by
similar steps. In our society, since relatively few individuals are removed
by migration, virtually all of the. losses are the result of deaths. These
are distributed over the entire age range, although concentrated in the
very young and the older ages. While the United States has not felt the
effects of war in the form of deep gashes in its age pyramid, it does have
some irregularities. The irregularities in the number of births in some
past years are reflected in age groups which today are unusually large or
unusually small. The small number of twenty-five-year-olds and the
large number of eleven-year-olds in the population in 1958 clearly reflect
past developments in fertility.
Rates of growth are subject to sharp changes in a short space of time.
Here again the changes that have taken place in the number of births
in the last twenty-five years amply illustrate the point.
Notestein has worked out an illustrative computation for a particular
time period. Had he chosen another time period, the results would have
been somewhat different but the method would have been equally
applicable.During the period which he considers, as throughout our
national history, the difference between the number of births and the
number of deaths has been more important numerically than the differ-
ence between the number of immigrants and the number of emigrants.
During each decade for which census figures are available, the excess of
births over deaths has contributed a larger share of the total increase than
the excess of immigration.
An advantage of presenting the computations for this particular period
is that they bring into focus the importance of changes in mortality in
recent years. The changes in fertility have been so dramatic that attention
has generally been focused on them. The period includes the years of
small numbers of births in the early 1930's, as well as the years with
large numbers of births since World War II. Notestein measures increases
against those which would have occurred had there been no immigration
and had the vital rates of i 929— 1931 prevailed. On that basis, reductions
in mortality have contributed 5 million persons to the population increase.
This is more than the contributions of increased fertility, 2 million, and
increased immigration, about 2 million. Obviously, the relative position
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of these three factors would have been different if the selected time period
were different.
However, I would like to stress the fact that reductions in mortality
are continually being made. There have been very substantial reductions
in infant mortality during the twenty-five-year period under consider-
ation, and there have also been reductions in the mortality of persons in
the older ages. Some of us spend a good deal of time explaining to laymen
that the increase in the average expectation of life does not mean the
total span has been increased, or that older persons are living longer.
We may have tended to give too small a role to the decreases in mortality
that have been taking place at the older ages.
In evaluating the prospects for the future, it would not be appropriate
to underrate further improvements in which are possible. Our
infant mortality can be further reduced, and there exists the possibility
of very significant developments in the control of the degenerative
diseases. We do not need to envision the possibilities that travel in space
may make time stand still for the few individuals who are likely to be
involved in that undertaking in our lifetime. While advances may be
slow in coming, improvements in mortality are likely to continue to make
significant contributions to the size of our population.
We need not concern ourselves at the moment with whether the period
chosen, or the vital rates which are applied, are the best suited ones.
The method does permit the isolation of factors, and thus helps to identify
the contribution to population growth which is made by the several
components.
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